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Summary: State-owned business associations have a peculiar role in the system of governmental exercising of (public) 
functions. They have to comply with the legislative regulations, the objectives set for the business association concerned 
already upon the formation, the regulations set on owner or - as the case may be - government level, the policy (sector)-level 
regulations and standards, the expectations of the parties using the public service, the short, medium and long-term strategic 
objectives the organisation set for itself, the corporate values set for the managers and the employees. Our study is aimed at 
answering the question whether there are any guidelines for the state-owned business associations, or how the compliance 
of the state-owned business associations could be audited at all. As a result of our research we found that the Hungarian 
regulation disposes of the topic of compliance only partially, and there is uniform normative regulation hiatus in respect of 
the state-owned business associations. Based on the review of the regulation applicable to the state administration entities, 
to the insurance and credit institution sector we drew up those regulatory topics which we propose for consideration in order 
to establish the compliance audit foundations of state owned business associations. 
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state-owned business associations are unique 
entities in the system of state functions: they 
are operated using public funds, they perform 
public function mainly, in most cases their 
activity is very costly and usually are not 
profitable directly. However, state-owned 
business association cannot fall out of the 
scope of the new type of audit policy of the 
state either, moreover, they are subject to even 
stricter rules. Our hypothesis is that in case 
of state-owned business associations control 
functions which belong to the broader concept 
of compliance audit shall be established in 
addition to the traditional public funds and 
owner’s audit.
Firstly, our study shows how the scope 
of state audit mechanisms has developed 
regarding state-owned business associations 
since 2010. Afterwards, we will examine which 
background compliance audit has in Hungary, 
and how the results thereof can be implemented 
in the current state-owned corporate system. 
Finally, regulatory recommendations will be E-mail address: boros.anita@uni-nke.hu
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presented based on our own system of criteria, 
highlighting that the synergic features of the 
control mechanisms fragmented above the 
state-owned business associations shall be 
reinterpreted. 
THe cHArAcTeriSTic OF STATe-
Owned BuSineSS ASSOciATiOnS - 
PreMiSe 
The system of Hungarian state-owned business 
associations shows a very heterogeneous 
picture. As opposed to the acquisitions of 
the private sector, the state founds business 
associations for business considerations, or 
acquires company participation for investment 
purposes or in order to gain profits very 
rarely. such companies are founded more if a 
function to be performed by the stated can be 
realised more efficiently through a budgetary 
institution owned by the state than within the 
frameworks of the budgetary institution. in 
case of such company formations the measures 
necessary in the interest of the public good - 
such as various national strategy, security of 
supply or security of continuous public utility 
supply, or national economy-level security 
policy aspects - are relevant. Consequently, 
there is only an insignificant number of state-
owned business associations which are of 
for-profit character, as well as there is a wide 
range of so-called dormant companies, which 
do not pursue any actual activity, but which 
fell under the scope of state-owned business 
associations typically through inheritance. 
The majority of these dormant companies 
are undergoing strike-off, winding-up and 
compulsory liquidation procedure. The rate of 
the companies is rather significant with regard 
to the scope of companies in the portfolio of 
Hungarian National Asset Management inc. 
(hereinafter referred to as HNAM inc.), more 
than forty percent (see Table 1).1
As a general rule, HNAM inc. attempts to 
sell the unnecessary company participations 
- i.e. which are no longer necessary for 
performing the public function - through 
electronic auction. According to the website 
of HNAM inc., only half of the participations 
of nearly 80 companies put up for auction 
during the summer of 2018 could be sold 
during the first bidding.2 A sale is made more 
difficult by the heterogeneous character, 
ability for corporate operation and value 
of the companies,3 since these are often 
companies which had not been in operation 
for several years. it is also worth to mention 
that these data do not show the entire state-
owned company portfolio, since the number 
of operational business association (company 
participations) is also increased by companies 
where HNAM inc. is not the one exercising the 
proprietary rights (not even indirectly4). This 
is possible, for example, where the exercise of 
proprietary rights had been allocated the entity 
performing the specific policy supervision. 
With regard to such companies it is permanent 
dilemma whether the uniform professional 
and proprietary enforcement of rights or the 
opposite, the separation thereof is the more 
efficient solution. After 2010, the proprietary 
enforcement of rights was more typical in 
the Hungarian practice (namely, apart from 
some exceptions, the minister responsible for 
the supervision of state property and HNAM 
inc. exercised the proprietary rights). Policy 
interest and expectations started to resolve 
this model a few years later and it became 
more and more frequent that in addition to 
the entities mentioned, other - mainly the 
body exercising professional supervision - 
became the exerciser of proprietary rights as 
well. After 2018, the model mentioned above 
was replaced by a more fragmented owner - 
exerciser of rights structural model. Obviously, 
the two extreme solutions have their 
advantages and disadvantages, however, with 
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respect to our topic one aspect definitively has 
to be highlighted: if the number of entities 
exercising the proprietary rights is low, then it 
is significantly easier to develop the principles 
of uniform corporate governance and to have 
those principles controlled by the owner, while 
in case of a lot of exercisers of proprietary 
rights aligning these principles uniformly and 
unifying the proprietary actions is difficult due 
to the participation of numerous operators, 
and thereby differences may arise in case of the 
companies allocated to different exercisers of 
proprietary rights. This results in differences 
not only in operation but in terms of system 
or criteria, planning and strategy as well. This 
is relevant to our topic because one of the key 
issues of compliance is with which system of 
criteria, objectives, expectation and rules a 
business association owned by the state have 
to comply, and which governmental control 
mechanisms the actual control of these 
presume.
The primary purpose of business 
associations owned by the stated is supporting 
the performance of public functions. For this 
very reason all companies or company groups 
require different management methodologies, 
adjusted to the (public) function performed 
by them. For example, the management 
of a large public service provider company 
(group) which has been generating loss for 
decades and the management of a company 
which is the only one on the market, has 
monopoly, and which actually belongs to 
the 'more comfortable' segment of state 
functions cannot be compared. However, it is 
undoubted, that 'Only well-managed, effectively 
and efficiently governed state (...) government-
owned enterprises serve the interest of the public. 
The assets managed by these companies are 
public assets, on the one hand their activities 
and the quality, effectiveness and efficiency of 
their financial management contribute to the 
responsible management of public funds, and on 
Table 1
The summary daTa of The composiTion of The companies which belong  
To The porTfolio of hnam inc.
company participations
amount of company 
participation (pcs)
rate of company 
participation (%)
The companies which belong to the portfolio of HnAM inc. 303 100.00
including the companies managed directly by HNAM Inc. 296 97.69
including the companies assigned or submitted for 
asset management 
7 2.31
Total of those companies managed directly by HnAM inc. 
in which the state has majority ownership (50% +1 vote)
154 52.03
Those companies managed directly by HnAM inc. in 
which the state has minority ownership
142 47.97
companies which are operated using the company 
participations managed directly by HnAM inc. 
176 59.46
From among the companies managed directly by HnAM 
inc. non-operational companies
120 40,54
Source:  www.mnv.hu (12 06 2019)
 studies 
Public Finance Quarterly  2019/4 545
the other hand the goods and services produced 
by them affect the quality of life, security, health 
and welfare of the population.' – states the study 
written by László Domokos and his co-authors 
(domokos, Várpalotai, Jakovác et al., 2016). 
simultaneously, it follows from the above that 
the state must find the instruments with which 
it can facilitate that the state-owned business 
associations manage the public property 
entrusted with them actually efficiently and 
effectively. 
due to the nature of the task such companies 
are in a unique situation also in the sense that 
they have to ensure the fulfilment of some kind 
of - mostly costly - state function by using the 
public property entrusted with them. in their 
case, the profit can in fact be measured in the 
increase of the level of standard of the public 
service and the satisfaction of the citizens. since 
the funding of these public assets is funded by 
the taxing of original income (Zéman, 2017), 
special attention shall be paid - even on national 
economy level - to the appropriate profound 
audit of the specific partial areas related to the 
performance of (public) functions of state-
owned enterprises.
THe AudiT rOle OF THe STATe wiTH 
reGArd TO STATe-Owned BuSineSS 
ASSOciATiOnS
The state-owned business associations 
determine the economy and the5 policy 
regulation methodology of any given state. 
The relationship between the state and its 
own enterprises had been examined by the 
OeCd as well, and in its recommendation6 it 
highlighted the key significance of the public 
policy purpose for which the given state-owned 
enterprise had been founded.7 The OeCd 
considers this fact as the starting point, and it 
is of special importance that the appropriate 
owner’s governance mechanisms are developed, 
which serve the realisation of these purposes 
the most, without the restricting the liability 
of the leaders of the state-owned enterprises by 
interfering in the management. The increasing 
governmental supervision and the appreciation 
of the owner’s instruments established by the 
OeCd with respect to the member states 
examined had been noticeable in our country 
as well after 2010 (Boros, 2017). 
since the beginning of the 2000s, the 
Hungarian national economy has had 
deepening problems: the debts of the public 
finances, the low efficiency of the budget 
policy and the poor audit potential deepened 
further during the 2007-2008 crisis (Lentner, 
2018; Lentner, 2019). As it had been explained 
by Csaba Lentner in his well-known study 
(Lentner, 2015b), substantial changes have 
occurred in the field of public finances since 
the crisis that erupted in 2007. ‘These are new 
times that we living, which require new solutions, 
and this is especially true for the field of public 
funds. Change and establishing new rules and 
founding new institutions are necessary because 
neither the State Audit Office of Hungary, nor 
the other independent institutions were able to 
prevent the chronic governmental overspending 
and the drastic increase of the public debt of the 
previous years.'  – explains the 2011 study of the 
chairman of the state Audit Office of Hungary 
(domokos, 2011). The change appeared in 
number of areas (Lentner, 2015b), therefore
•	in particular on institutional level, for 
example in the regulation related to 
the central bank and state audit office 
regulation adopted as the first cardinal act 
(domokos, 2016) domokos, Pulay, Pető 
et. al, 2015), 
•	in supporting the strengthening of the 
trust vested in the functioning of the state, 
•	in the development of the efficient tax 
system (Lentner, 2015b), 
•	in making the debt ceiling a constitutional 
matter (domokos, 2011), 
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•	in developing the effective and useful 
audit system, and last but not least, in 
strengthening the Fiscal Council in the 
Fundamental Law (Kovács, 2016; Kovács, 
2014; domokos, 2011). 
in the Hungarian model based on the active 
role of the state, the purpose of the audit 
system prevailing in national economy level 
has changed in a direction which facilitated 
the actual intervention of the entity authorised 
thereto in the financial processes. As it is 
explained by Csaba Lentner: ‘it is a fundamental 
national interest that the management of 
Hungarian public funds and national assets is 
transparent, efficient and accountable. The rise of 
Hungary and overcoming the current economic 
and social issues are inconceivable without 
professional and regular audit.' (Lentner, 
2015b) These changes lead to that the state 
has to set new types of audit requirements for 
its business association which belong to its 
own assets. These requirements appear with 
ever increasing strength - on the one hand - 
on the regulatory level (external factors), and 
- on the other hand - on the level of corporate 
governance and internal control mechanisms 
(internal factors).
in respect of the external factors, having 
examined the regulatory side briefly, it can be 
established that the proper management of 
public funds is an obligation deducible from 
the Fundamental Law (domokos, Várpalotai, 
Javovác et.al., 2016). The constitutional rules 
are complemented by the acts related to assets. 
On the one hand, Act CXCVi of 2011 on 
National Assets (hereinafter referred to as 
National Assets Act), Act CVi of 2007 on 
state-owned Assets (state-owned Assets Act) 
and the implementation decree thereof. in 
addition to the general regulations governing 
assets, the civil law provisions stipulating the 
general rules of corporate functioning also 
have a key role, as well as the rules of Act 
CXXii of 2009 on the economical Operation 
of Public Business Organisations pertaining 
especially to state-owned enterprises. 
Another important scope of sources of 
law are those sources of law which set the 
normative rules pertaining to public finances, 
in particular the acts on public finances, 
accounting, rules of taxation, the specific types 
of tax and duties, as well as the implementation 
decrees thereof, the public procurement and 
competition regulations, and also the various 
sector-specific regulations as well, which 
stipulate additional requirements in respect 
of the business associations which provide the 
specific public services (Lentner, 2015a).
Naturally, in addition to the above, 
numerous other normative regulations and 
regulations not deemed as normative - which 
often arise from international implementation 
obligations - determined the frameworks of 
the functioning of state-owned enterprises 
(especially in the public service sectors).
However, the unique, special purpose of 
the business associations does not lie in the 
regulations mentioned above. Namely, in the 
Hungarian practice, in case of the formation 
of the new state-owned business association, 
usually a government decision specifies 
the purposes of establishing the business 
association, in addition to determining the 
main features necessary for the formation. The 
provisions of the government decisions are 
then formulated by the exerciser of proprietary 
rights to the state-owned enterprises, in 
form of an act which is suitable to result in 
legal effects in terms of company law, i.e. in 
owner’s decision.8 Consequently, the owner’s 
resolutions are relevant as well. such owner’s 
resolutions are mirrored by each and every 
company through the acts of their own 
decision-making forums as well. However, 
these can be deemed as legal statements made 
within the company, which legal statements 
we classify in the category of internal factors. 
One should not forget about the multi-layered 
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– sometimes casuistic – internal policy system 
of state-owned business associations either, 
which could also affect the flexible, or – as the 
case may be – rigid operational methodology 
of this type of business association. Finally, this 
category also includes the acts of the executive 
officer or the corporate bodies of various 
legal status, which again may contribute 
significantly to the establishment of the 
modern state-owned corporate operational 
criteria. 
in fact, the enforcement of all regulations 
and requirements determining the system of 
objectives of the operation of state-owned 
enterprises constitutes separate topics, the 
hiatuses of which may give rise to questioning 
the justification of the existence of the company 
concerned. in contrast to the manager-like 
state functioning which took root in the 
neoliberal economic system (Polanyai, 2001) 
and which relies on the passivity of the state, 
the economic system which has gained ground 
recently, relies on active state participation and 
which may be understood as the renaissance 
of the Keynesian philosophy ’means the 
foundation of good state functioning’ (Lentner, 
2019). Thus, the activity of the state on the 
appropriate level is essential (Lentner, 2019). 
The questions is how the state can audit 
the compliance and appropriateness of the 
operation of state-owned enterprises?
cOMPliAnce AudiT in cASe  
OF STATe-Owned enTerPriSeS
in the private sector, compliance can be 
considered as an already widespread field 
which had been developed in practice as 
well- At larger privately-owned companies, 
a separate compliance department manages 
the issue of corporate compliance. However, 
the issue of compliance is not characteristic 
only to the corporate sector, since numerous 
scientific disciplines study how the regulations 
applicable to the given sector can be enforced 
(Cramer, Roy, Burrell et al., 2008; simon, 
Clinton, 2009). Compliance is a rather 
complex concept, since it includes – among 
others – financial, economic, tax, business, 
legal, ethical, sustainability and proprietary 
compliance as well. 
in course of compliance audits, the state 
Audit of Hungary examined whether the 
‘activity or operation subject to the audit complies 
with the regulations and requirements applicable 
to the audited entity in all significant respects’ 
(The Principles of Compliance Audit, 2015). 
it is worth mentioning here that state Audit 
Office of Hungary distinguishes between two 
sub-types of compliance audit: regulatory 
audit and appropriateness audit. in course of 
the audit procedures, the two methods may 
be combined as well. The regulatory audit 
is aimed primarily at the examination of 
compliance with legal regulations, while the 
appropriateness audit pertains to areas where 
some kind of normative regulatory hiatus is 
experienced, and the principles constitute 
that sub-type of compliance audits which 
shall be applied in cases where the legislative 
regulations cannot be applied, or where 
obvious legislative deficiencies are noticeable 
with regard to the consideration of specific 
issues, and the issue concerned cannot be 
deliberated upon based on the principles of 
the recognised practices.
in course of the assessment of the 
compliance of an organisation the question we 
are actually aiming to answer is whether the 
operating mechanisms of the organisation can 
be subordinated to all regulations applicable 
to the organisation, and the objectives and 
requirements set for it. in the narrower 
sense compliance means the observance and 
enforcement of the legal regulations – including 
the decisions of the owner – applicable to the 
business association. However, in the broader 
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sense, it means so much more: it also means 
compliance with the objectives set for the 
business association concerned already upon 
the formation, the regulations set on owner or 
- as the case may be - government level, the 
policy (sector)-level regulations and standards, 
the expectations of the parties using the public 
service, the short, medium and long-term 
strategic objectives the organisation set for 
itself, the corporate values set for the managers 
and the employees. 
Currently there is no concrete regulations 
which would give guidelines on the internal 
regulation of compliance for publicly-
owned business associations, although the 
examination of this topic is becoming more 
and more widespread on international level as 
well.
in Hungary, the topic of compliance and 
the elaboration of the control function related 
thereto has appeared in recent years mainly 
in the field of the law of credit institutions 
and insurance law (Kovács, szóka, 2016). in 
these sectors, the rules of legal compliance 
have been developed on a very high level, in 
acts. Naturally, there are aides for state-owned 
business associations as well, however, due 
to the differences in terminology, companies 
do not even realise that they are facing a 
compliance topic.
According to Act CXCV of 2011 on Public 
Finances (hereinafter referred to as Public 
Finances Act), the purpose of public finances 
controls is to ensure proper, economical, 
efficient and effective management of the 
funds of public finances and the national 
assets, as well as the proper fulfilment of the 
reporting and data provision obligations.9
According to Article 10 (2) of the National 
Assets Act, the exerciser of owner’s rights shall 
regularly audit the management of the national 
assets by the user of the national assets, and 
it shall notify the user of the national assets 
of its findings, furthermore, if the findings 
of the exerciser of owner’s rights concern 
the competence of the state Audit Office of 
Hungary, then it shall notify the state Audit 
Office of Hungary as well. The activity related 
to the exercising of proprietary rights attached 
to state-owned assets is audited by the state 
Audit Office of Hungary annually.10 in 
addition to the above, HNAM inc. regularly 
audits the management of the state-owned 
assets by persons, entities or other users which 
are contracted partners of HNAM inc., and 
it notifies the supervisory board of HNAM 
inc., the entity audited, and if necessary, 
the minister and the state Audit Office of 
Hungary of its findings.11
The Public Finances Act specifies different 
levels of public finances controls, thus it 
pertains to 
•	external – the state Audit Office of 
Hungary, and in cases specified by the 
Public Finances Act, the treasury -, 
•	the governmental – governmental control 
entity, the entity auditing the european 
subsidies, and the treasury - , 
•	and internal audit functions, with regard 
to the entities within its scope (domokos, 
Várpalotai, Javovác et.al., 2016).
Based on the iNtOsAi internal control 
standards applicable to the public sector it can 
be established that ‘internal control is a dynamic 
and complex process, which adjusts to the changes 
occurring in the organisation constantly. The 
management and levels of the employees shall 
participate in the process in order to determine 
risks and to provide reasonable securities for 
the fulfilment of the mission of the organisation 
and for the achievement of its goals set.'.12 in 
the COsO Framework, internal control is a 
process which is influenced by the board of 
directors, the management and the employees 
of the company, and which had been 
established to provide reasonable assurances 
in respect of organisational objectives such as 
efficient and effective operation, the reliability 
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of internal and external financial reporting, 
as well as compliance with the relevant laws, 
regulations and internal policies.  
The relation between the public finances 
controls and the state-owned business 
associations is essentially established by – 
in addition to the rules of assets mentioned 
above – Article 69/A of the Public Finances 
Act, according to which the rules applicable 
to the internal control system of the 
budgetary institutions shall be applicable to 
the internal control system of other entities 
classified as parts of the public sector.13 The 
other entities classified as parts of the public 
sector are currently specified by a Minister of 
Finance Announcement (Official Gazette No. 
2018/36). Point 12 of Article 1 of the Public 
Finances Act specifies the definition of other 
entities classified as parts of the public sector. 
This scope includes those organisations which 
are not part of the public finances under the 
Public Finances Act, which however belong 
to the government sector under Council 
Regulation (eC) No 479/2009 of 25 May 
2009 on the application of the Protocol on 
the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the 
treaty establishing the european Community. 
Other organisations classified as parts of 
the government sector are bound by more 
obligations since they are obliged to provide 
data to the minister responsible for public 
finances for the purpose of preparation of 
the act on the central budget, shall fulfil 
data provision for the preparation of the 
compilations to be presented mandatorily in 
the act on the implementation of the central 
budget, they shall fulfil the regular data 
provisions specified in Government decree No. 
368/2011 (Xii.31.) on the implementation 
of the Public Finances (hereinafter referred 
to as implementation decree for the Public 
Finances Act), and these organisations may 
conclude any debt-generating transaction 
under Article 9 of Act CXCiV of 2011 on 
the economic stability of Hungary validly 
only upon the prior approval of the minister 
responsible for public finances, in accordance 
with the provisions of Gov. decree No. 
353/2011 (Xii:30.) on the detailed Rules of 
Approval of debt-generating transactions.
Part i of the announcement14 includes the 
other organisations classified as parts of the 
government sector which are in operation at 
the time of the issuance of the announcement, 
and which therefore are obliged to enforce 
the regulations presented according to the 
act. Point A) of the announcement specifies 
the organisations classified in the Central 
government sub-sector.15 The majority of the 
one hundred and forty-seven organisations is 
a business association subject to some kind of 
state ownership.16
The rules applicable to internal audit are 
specified by sub-heading 47 of the Public 
Finances Act, while the detailed rules of the 
internal control system are specified by Gov. 
decree No. 370/2011. (Xii. 31.) on the 
internal Control system and internal Audit of 
Budgetary institutions (hereinafter referred to 
as internal Control decree), the scope of which 
extends to the other organisations classified as 
parts of the government sector as well.17
At the same time, the internal Control 
decree does not pertain to the topic of 
compliance but specifies the specific rules 
applicable to the elements of the internal 
control system.
Actually, it can be established that there is 
no unique legal regulation for the compliance, 
integrity and internal control of state-owned 
business associations which had been developed 
specifically for this scope but through various 
referring provisions, the specific rules of the 
public finances legislation related to budgetary 
institutions shall be applicable. Another point 
to think about is whether it would be practical 
to determine the rules applicable to the lines of 
defence of the external audit and the internal 
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control mechanisms of state-owned business 
associations in a separate law, taking into 
consideration the particularities we outlined. 
Our answer is evidently that the development 
of such a flagship law would fill a gap, since 
the audit of state-owned business associations 
is a very complex process. The functioning 
thereof is determined partially by property 
law and (public) finance law, and partially by 
civil law, as well as partially by administrative 
law, especially the specific administration, i.e. 
special part thereof. it follows from the above 
that control mechanisms are concentrated 
to such control focus areas, and therefore 
the controlling synergy often fails to prevail 
between them. For example, owner’s control 
should extend to each and every partial areas, 
however – in addition to the assessment of 
the financial or legal compliance – it should 
definitively extend to whether the organisation 
concerned complies with the expectation 
and needs of the owner – i.e. the state – and 
the users of its services – the citizens and 
organisations – as well as with the objectives set 
at the time of the formation. The difficulty of 
the audits which cover the entire range of the 
operation of state-owned business associations 
is that division of control and the exercising 
of owner’s rights of such companies among 
multiple entities. Therefore, it may be possible 
that the exerciser of owner’s rights and the 
entity exercising professional supervision are 
completely separate from one another, which 
causes numerous difficulties in the operation, 
in funding, and not least in controlling as 
well. in addition, the creation of synergy 
among the exercisers of owner’s rights of often 
cumbersome, too: the acts of exercising owner’s 
rights established along the lines of different 
legal grounds cause the content particularities 
thereof to differ significantly from each other 
as well. Just one example. we emphasised how 
important business planning and the owner’s 
guidance related thereto are. in this regard, 
in connection with the structure, content 
and main element of the business plans some 
exerciser’s of owner’s rights develop planning 
guidelines, while other do not participate 
in the operation thereof at all, apart from 
supporting the company concerned. 
undoubtedly, the scope of laws with which a 
state-owned business association must comply 
is versatile. Naturally, the control functions 
specified in the laws have a wide range of 
measures, however, the countless supervisory, 
controlling and proprietary authorisations also 
causes the fragmentation of the controlling 
authorisations simultaneously, and several 
segments remain which have to be controlled 
internally by the business association 
concerned. This requires the development 
of an efficient internal control system. The 
internal control system is a system of processes 
which includes all those principles, procedures 
and internal policies which the budgetary 
institution must develop and operate in 
order to ensure that its activity is proper and 
is compliant with the requirement of cost-
efficiency, efficiency and efficacy (Kovács, 
2007; cited by: Gyüre, 2012; Kis, 2015). in 
our opinion, the framework of this shall be 
determined on statutory level.
With regard to the terminological 
distinction of compliance and integrity, it is 
worth to refer to the following: according to 
the Methodological Guidelines developed 
by the state Audit Office of Hungary for 
surveying the anti-corruption situation of 
state administration bodies, the establishment 
of the anti-corruption controls thereof and for 
the audit of the enforcement of such controls18, 
the word ’intergity’ derived from Latin means 
intactness, incorruption and immaculacy. 
Accordingly, in terms of organisation integrity 
means the operation of a given entity in 
compliance with the social expectations 
and to be subordinated to strict values. The 
purpose of the integrity survey launched by 
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the state Audit Office of Hungary in 2011 is 
‘to identify the risk which adversely affect ethical, 
transparent operation, as well as exploring 
the controls designated to manage such risks’ 
(Németh, Bartus, szabó, 2016). in short, this 
means that ‘it does what it had been established 
for, in a way it is expected from it and fulfils 
its mission’ (Pulay, Jenei, 2016). This shows 
that organisational integrity and compliance 
are close concepts, and an opportunity for 
distinction may be if the compliance definition 
we explained is compared to the what we wrote 
about integrity. undoubtedly, the objectives 
appearing in both concepts are on the same 
vertical. The higher the level of the integrity of 
an entity is, the more efficient the compliance 
controls are (see Table 2).
THe OPPOrTuniTieS FOr SuPPOrTinG 
OrGAniSATiOnAl inTeGriTy And 
cOMPliAnce in cASe OF STATe-
Owned BuSineSS ASSOciATiOnS – 
cOncluSiOn And recOMMendATiOnS
As we have already mentioned, the operation 
of state-owned business associations and the 
social trust factor concerning them are crucial 
in respect of the functioning of the state, its 
international or even social reputation, as well 
as its competitiveness and efficiency. For this 
reason we think it is very important to examined 
which criteria, objectives, expectations and 
rules state-owned business associations have 
to comply with, and which state control 
mechanisms are worth establishing for these. it 
is certain that the operation of these companies 
shall be subjected to enhanced and actual 
control: from the aspects of lawfulness, asset 
management, ownership and public finances. 
The control mechanisms shall also cover 
numerous issues which relate only partially to 
specific areas of control, therefore in particular 
to the system of objectives giving rise to the 
formation of the company, for in the event a 
company is no longer able to fulfil its purpose, 
it is unable to comply with the fundamental 
system of objectives set for it by the state, then 
the justification of the existence of the company 
concerned may be called into question. We also 
emphasised that in course of the assessment of 
the compliance of an organisation the question 
we are actually aiming to answer is whether the 
operating mechanisms of the organisation can 
be subordinated to all regulations applicable 
to the organisation, and the objectives and 
Table 2
The eVT, fiV and frc indexes reflecTing The inTegriTy VulnerabiliTy  
and The esTablishmenT of The conTrols of The parTicipanTs of The 2016-2018 
inTegriTy surVey
index 
The value of the 
index in 2016
(%)
The value of the 
index in 2017
(%)
The value of the 
index in 2018 
(%)
inherent Vulnerability index (eVT) 48.4 41.4 41.6
Factors increasing Vulnerability (FiV) 35.2 25.0 27.8
Factors reinforcing controls (Frc) 60.0 49.8 46.6
Source: own compilation based on the 2016-2018 integrity surveys of the State Audit Office of Hungary
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requirements set for it. We formulated the 
narrower and broader definition of the 
compliance to be enforced in respect of 
state-owned enterprises: in the narrower 
sense, compliance means the observance and 
enforcement of the legal regulations – including 
the decisions of the owner – applicable to the 
business association. However, in the broader 
sense, it means so much more: it also means 
compliance with the objectives set for the 
business association concerned already upon 
the formation, the regulations set on owner or 
- as the case may be - government level, the 
policy (sector)-level regulations and standards, 
the expectations of the parties using the public 
service, the short, medium and long-term 
strategic objectives the organisation set for 
itself, the corporate values set for the managers 
and the employees. We could also see that a 
process for the regulation of legal compliance 
has already started in the legal system, with 
respect to the credit institution and insurance 
industries. 
We also pointed out that the controlling 
of the numerous regulations to be enforced 
with regard to state-owned enterprises is 
based on the cooperation of the organisations 
which have different controlling competences. 
However, the roles of the executive officers of 
the companies in ensuring compliance should 
not be disregarded. The Public Finances 
Act, the internal Control decree and the 
integrity Management system19 already 
provide normative bases for this. This scope 
is complemented by the gap-filling research20 
and surveys of the state Audit Office of 
Hungary, which – year by year – serve as 
guidelines for ensuring the organisational 
integrity and compliance of state-owned 
companies (Németh, Martus, Vargha et al., 
2019), (see Table 3).
undoubtedly, the improvement of the 
compliance and structural integrity, as well 
as increasing the efficiency of state-owned 
business associations may be achieved through 
numerous measures (Németh e., Martus B., 
Vargha B., 2018). such measures include 
which presume the intra-organisational 
commitment of the manager and employees 
of the state-owned enterprise, and their need 
for establishing a compliance culture. There is 
a group of measures which may be formulated 
from outside, by the exerciser of the owner’s 
rights and/or the entity exercising policy control 
or supervision. Naturally, the organisational 
integrity of these is the responsibility of the 
manager of the company. Finally, these issues 
may be influenced by legislative measures as 
well, just to mention the most important ones 
(Pulay, Kovács, 2019). in order to improve the 
efficiency of the audit, these control mechanisms 
shall be used in a harmonised manner, and the 
cooperation among the entities conducting the 
audit shall be ensured.
As we have mentioned, the adoption of a 
separate law for the internal control system of 
state-owned companies would we progressive. 
The already mentioned Article 69/A of the Public 
Finances Act already provides opportunity to 
adopt such law (government decree). 
taking into consideration the rules of the 
internal Control decree and the integrity 
Management system in addition to the 
rules of the credit institution and insurance 
legislation, it would be advisable to regulate 
the following.
•	the executive officer of the state-owned 
business association is responsible for the 
establishment, operation and improvement 
of the internal control system,
•	in course of the establishment of the 
internal control system, the unique 
characteristics of the organisation shall be 
taken into consideration,
•	it is advisable to integrate those rules of the 
internal Control decree which are well-
established in respect of the budgetary 
institutions,
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•	similar to the provisions regulated 
on statutory level in the law of credit 
institutions and insurance law, it is 
advisable to specify the requirement 
of legislative compliance on legislative 
level as well, however, in addition to 
the above and relying on the definition 
of compliance in the broader sense, the 
compliance expectations of the values 
and objectives of state-owned business 
associations and the realisation of the 
related public functions, as well as the 
necessity of specifying the measures 
necessary to ensure ethical operation,
Table 3
The areas of esTablishmenT of inTegriTy (2016-2018)
The areas of establishment  
of the integrity controls  
in 2016
The areas of establishment  
of the integrity controls  
in 2017
The areas of establishment  
of the integrity controls  
in 2018
•	Property management, 
management of public funds,
•	corporate governance, 
supervision,








•	 internal controls, risk 
management,
•	Special anti-corruption systems 
and procedures.
•	responsible management (provision of the 
owner’s property, legal environment, role 
of the supervisory board, reporting to the 
owner, discretion of the owner, company 
management, development of the company 
structure, management information 
system);
•	Performance of public functions, external 
relations (performance of public function, 
provision of public service, specification 
of fees, support provided to external 
organisations, acceptance of support from 
such organisations, risks of contractual 
partner, outsourcing, disclosure, 
publicity);  
•	Financial management (property 
management, european union funding, 
partnership contracts, company group, 
financial management efficiency); 
•	compliance, audit (internal regularity, 
public procurement, bidding, accounting 
audit, external and internal audits); 
•	Organisational culture, ethical conduct 
(integrity culture in the internal policies, 
allowances for private purposes, 
selection of employees, conflict of 
interest, performance evaluation, ethics 
proceedings, media presence).
in addition to the areas specified in 
the 2017 analysis:
•	external relations: receiving 
external support, or providing 
support, accounting of 
the support, surveying 
the satisfaction of clients, 
disclosure of data of public 
interest.
•	external and internal audits: 
accounting audit, audits 
conducted by external bodies, 
level of standard and utilisation 
of the internal audits, risk 
analysis and risk management.
•	Organisational culture: human 
resources management, 
regulation and assessment of 
conflicts of interest during the 
selection of the employees, 
remuneration system, 
performance evaluation, ethics 
proceedings.
Source: own compilation based on the 2016-2018 integrity surveys of the State Audit Office of Hungary
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•	the operation of compliance reporting/
complaint management system is a well-
established practice among the business 
associations of the private sector. in 
some places, these kinds of reports are 
examined by a completely independent 
person or body. institutionalising this 
is recommended in case of state-owned 
business associations as well,
•	it is advisable to develop the issues 
concerning compliance and organisational 
integrity according to the uniform 
guidelines of the exerciser of owner’s 
rights, taking into consideration the 
unique corporate particularities and on 
the level of organisational regulations,
•	specifying the provisions applicable 
to internal control for state-owned 
companies on the level of the regulation 
mentioned above shall also be taken into 
consideration. in connection with this it 
is advisable to strengthen the relationship 
and the cooperation of the internal 
controller and the bodies, organisations 
fulfilling other control functions (for 
example, with the supervisory board, the 
auditor or compliance organisation),
•	the integration of the contents of the 
integrity reports of the state Audit 
Office of Hungary and the international 
compliance standards into the corporate 
regulation shall be handled as an 
issues which belongs to the controlling 
competence of the exerciser of owner’s 
rights.
We hope that through our study we 
contributed to highlighting the topic of 
compliance from the state, enterprise aspect 
and to the cornerstones of the establishment 
of the regulatory environment. 










4 understood as company participations assigned or 
submitted for asset management.
5 see Preamble Article (9) of Regulation (eC) No 
77/2008 on establishing a common framework 
for business registers for statistical purposes 
and repealing Council Regulation (eeC) No 
2186/93
6 OeCd Guidelines on Corporate Governance 
of state-Owned enterprises. Online: http://
www.oecd.org/corporate/guidelines-corporate-
governance-sOes.htm 3. (25.05.2019)
7 in 2013, in its exploratory opinion on 
‘The unexplored economic potential of eu 
competitiveness — reform of state-owned 
enterprises’, the european economic and 
social Committee argued that the state should, 
ensure that there is proper public scrutiny and 
regulation, which requires putting in place a 
system of governance for its public undertakings, 
underpinned by the participation of all 
Notes
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stakeholders, as well as representatives of the staff 
of those undertakings.
8 According to Article 29(3) of the state-owned 
Assets Act, unless any ministerial decree under 
Article 3(2a) of the state-owned Assets Act 
stipulated otherwise, the entity authorised 
to found economic organisations, to acquire 
participation in such organisations, as well 
as to exercise the proprietary (member’s, 
shareholder’s, founder’s) rights on behalf of 
the state is HNAM inc. in addition, HNAM 
inc. may grant authorisation to other persons 
and organisations to proceed in course of the 
formation of the economic organisation, and 
the acquire company participation on behalf of 
the state.
9 see section 61 of the Public Finances Act.
10 see section 2 (4) of the state-owned Assets 
Act.




13 in compliance with Council directive 2011/85/
eu on requirements for budgetary frameworks of 
the Member states.
14 Part ii of the Announcement includes those 
government-sector other organisations terminated 
or phased out in 2017 in respect of which the 
legal successors thereof – or in the absence of legal 
successor the party obliged to prepare its annual 
account in accordance with the accounting rules – 
is subject to subsequent data provision obligation 
for 2017.
15 Meanwhile, Point B) of the Announcement is 
about the organisations classified in the Local 
government sub-sector.
16 in addition, foundations, foundations for public 
benefit, credit institution organisations, funds and 
authorities may also be found in this part.
17 see Article 1 of the internal Control decree.
18 Methodological guidelines for surveying the anti-
corruption situation of state administration bodies, 
the establishment of the anti-corruption controls 
thereof and for the audit of the enforcement 




19 Government decree No. 50/2013 (ii.25.) on 
the integrity Management system of state 
Administration Bodies and on the Procedures 
Applicable to the Acceptance of Lobbyists. 
20 state Audit Office of Hungary: Analysis of 
the results of the integrity survey conducted 
among the business associations in majority state 
ownership 2016 Available at: https://www.asz.
hu/storage/files/files/Publikaciok/elemzesek_
tanulmanyok/2016/gt_integritas_tanulmany.
pdf?ctid=976 (25.04.2019); state Audit Office of 
Hungary: study on the 2017 integrity situation of 




state Audit Office of Hungary: study on the 2018 
integrity situation of publicly owned business 
associations. Available at: https://asz.hu/storage/
files/files/elemzesek/2019/20190320_kgt_int.pdf 
(25 04 2019) 
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